UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

2-26-2013

State v. See Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40037

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. See Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40037" (2013). Not Reported. 951.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/951

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

COPY

PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

)

NO. 40037

)
)
)

Franklin Co. Case No.
CR-2012-28

)

)

TIMOTHY SCOTT SEE,

)

Defendant-Appellant.

________________

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

)
)

Has See failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by
imposing a unified sentence of three years, with one year fixed, upon his guilty plea to
failure to register as a sex offender, or by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of
sentence?

See Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
See, a registered sex offender in the State of Indiana, left Indiana without
changing his registered address and, over a period of approximately one year, moved
between Colorado, California, Arizona, Utah, and Idaho, "failing to register with each

1

move."

(PSI, pp.2-3.) When officers contacted See in Preston, Idaho in December

2011, they advised him that he was required to register within two days. (PSI, p.2.)
See failed to register and, in January 2012, officers located See at a residence in
Preston and were informed that See had been living at the Preston residence "since
before Thanksgiving." (PSI, p.2.)
The state charged See with failure to register as a sex offender. (R., pp.44-45.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, See pied guilty and the state agreed to recommend a
unified sentence of three years, with one year fixed.
sentencing, See's counsel

(R., pp.55-57, 64-65.)

At

requested that the district court follow the state's

recommendation. (Tr., p.8, Ls.3-9; p.10, Ls.12-14; p.11, Ls.4-6, 10-14.) Consistent with
the plea agreement and the recommendations of both parties, the district court imposed
a unified sentence of three years, with one year fixed. (R., pp.68-70.) See filed a notice
of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.74-76.) He also filed a timely
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. (R., p.72. 1 )
See asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his purported remorse and
acceptance of responsibility,

because he "had no other new charges despite

investigations," and because the district court "first noted an LSI score of 32 in support

1

According to the updated register of actions, a hearing on See's Rule 35 motion was
held on June 28, 2012, and the district court entered a Minute Entry and Order,
presumably denying the motion, on the same date. (See Franklin County case number
CR-2012-28 at https://www.idcourts.us/repository/caseNumberSearch.do.)
2

of the sentence, but then agreed that the score did not match up with the PSI writer's
notation that Mr. See was a medium risk to offend." (Appellant's brief, pp.5-6 (citations
omitted).) There are two reasons why See's argument fails. First, See requested the
sentence he received and is therefore precluded by the invited error doctrine from
challenging the sentence on appeal. Second, even if this Court reviews the merits of
See's claims, he has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
A party is estopped, under the doctrine of invited error, from complaining that a
ruling or action of the trial court that the party invited, consented to or acquiesced in was
error. State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000). The
purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who "caused or played an
important role in prompting a trial court" to take a particular action from "later
challenging that decision on appeal." State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237,240, 985 P.2d 117,
120 (1999). This doctrine applies to sentencing decisions as well as to rulings during
trial. State v. Leyva, 117 Idaho 462, 465, 788 P.2d 864, 867 (Ct. App. 1990).
As part of the plea agreement, the state agreed to recommend a unified
sentence of three years, with one year fixed.

(R., pp.55-57.)

At sentencing, See's

counsel requested that the district court follow the plea agreement, stating: "[T]he state
had agreed to impose - recommend a unified three, one being fixed and two being
indeterminate. Your Honor, that is going to be my recommendation as well, in spite of
the fact that the presentence investigator recommends a retained jurisdiction program"
(Tr., p.8, Ls.3-9); "I believe that the plea agreement as it is written is an appropriate
sentence" (Tr., p.10, Ls.12-14); and, "I would ask the court to follow the terms and
conditions of the plea agreement" (Tr., p.11, Ls.4-6).
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Consistent with the plea

agreement and the recommendations of both parties, the district court imposed a unified
sentence of three years, with one year fixed. (R., pp.68-70.) Because See received the
very sentence he requested, he cannot claim on appeal that it is excessive or that the
district court abused its discretion by declining to reduce his sentence. Therefore, See's
claim of an abuse of sentencing discretion is barred by the doctrine of invited error.
Even if this Court considers the merits of See's claim, he has still failed to
establish an abuse of discretion. The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse
of discretion standard considering the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144
Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460,
50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is
presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of
confinement.

!st (citing

State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where

a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating
that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614,
615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this
burden the appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable
view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable,
however, if it appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society
or any of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.

!st

In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district considered See's ongoing
disregard for the law and the risk he presents to the community. See's criminal record
includes at least three felony convictions. (PSI, pp.3-4.) He was convicted (in Indiana)
of felony sexual battery in 2005, at the age of 40, after he had sexual intercourse with a
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12-year-old child.

(PSI, pp.2-4, 20. 2) He was placed on probation, but violated his

probation and was "sent to prison." (PSI, p.4.) After being released from prison, See
signed a sex offender registration form on May 14, 2010, in which he acknowledged that
he was required to register within three days of changing residence, at least once every
seven days if homeless or staying at a temporary residence, and within three days of
arriving in any county in which he held employment. (PSI, p.13.) According to See, he
left Indiana in April 2011, after which he moved between Colorado, California, Arizona,
Utah, and Idaho. (PSI, pp.2-3.) Although he obtained an Arizona identification card, he
failed to register "with each move." (PSI, p.2.) He began working in Idaho in November
2011 and lived at an apartment in Preston, Idaho "since before Thanksgiving." (PSI,
pp.2, 8.) See failed to register as a sex offender in Idaho and, in December 2011, his
name was run through NCIC during a traffic stop.

(PSI, p.2.) At that time, officers

advised See that he was required to register within two days. (PSI, p.2.) See again
failed to register.

(PSI, p.2.)

A detective from the State of Indiana subsequently

contacted the Franklin County Sheriff's Office and notified Idaho authorities that See
was "non-compliant, as he was ... not living at his registered address."

(PSI, p.2.)

Officers arrested See at his Preston residence in January 2012, at which time See
claimed that he was not required to register unless he was "establishing residency."
(PSI, p.2.) Although he eventually admitted, during his presentence interview, that he
had been living at the residence in Preston for several months, See continued to justify
his failure to register by claiming that he "was told if he did not stay for longer than three

2

Pages attached to the PSI have been numbered consecutively, beginning at page 12.
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days, he would not have to register. He stated it was his plan to move on, and not stay
in Idaho." (PSI, pp.3, 6.)
At sentencing, the state argued:
I guess the comment I would make, Your Honor, is that this was an
individual that had left the jurisdiction that he was required to register in.
He was, frankly, on the run. Nobody knew where he was from his
jurisdiction. The only way they found him was that he ... happened to be
in [a] vehicle that was pulled over. He was run through the NCIC criminal
database by the investigating officer at that time.
The investigating officer back in his jurisdiction then did a
nationwide search and found that he'd been run through NCIC here in
Preston, Idaho. He recontacted that officer and said see if you can find
him. Because we're a small community, small departments, we recognize
people. That particular deputy remembered seeing him, running him
through the check, and went and found the residence where he was living
at the time and where he'd been for over a month.
Your Honor, we have these laws in place for a reason, for the
protection of society. I think that's the overarching concern here from the
state's perspective, is to ensure that individuals that have either been
found guilty or who have pied guilty to a sex related crime register
appropriately for the requisite period of time. Mr. See did not do that. This
was a case that crossed state lines so it raises even additional awareness
and concern for the state.
(Tr., p.11, L.17 - p.12, L.20.) Likewise, the district court stated, "This court views the
sex offender requirements associated with registration of those individuals who are
convicted sex offenders to be a statute that deals specifically with the issue of protection
of society. That is one means whereby we as a society have the ability to monitor and
keep track of those individuals who have been convicted of sex related offenses" (Tr.,
p.14, Ls.17-24), and, "So, the protection of society plays a very real role in what I do in
this particular matter" (Tr., p.16, Ls.3-4). The sentence imposed is reasonable in light of
See's failure to register in any jurisdiction or to notify authorities of his whereabouts for
over eight months.

6

See claims that the district court abused its discretion when it "first noted an LSI
score of 32 in support of the sentence, but then agreed that the score did not match up
with the PSI writer's notation that Mr. See was a medium risk to offend, and did not
inquire further to determine if the LSI score was reported in error, or if the reporting of
the medium range was incorrect."

(Appellant's brief, p.6 (citations omitted).)

The

presentence investigator wrote, "According to the LSI-R, the defendant scored 32 out of
54. This places him in the medium range for risk of reoffending. (0-15 Low Risk, 16-30
Moderate Risk, 31-54 High Risk)." (PSI, p.10 (parentheses original).) At sentencing,
See's counsel, Mr. Marler, did not request a correction to the PSI, but merely noted that
there was "a little bit of a discrepancy." (Tr., p.18, Ls.11-13.) The following exchange
took place:
THE COURT:

Well, it appears to be probably a typographical error,
because the ranges are - that places him at the low
end of the high range, but it is within the high range. I
appreciate your clarification of that point. I do note
that the presentence investigator does say medium
range for reoffending. If that is their conclusion, I
disagree with that conclusion.

MR. MARLER:

The other explanation, the 32 score may be in error
as well.

THE COURT:

And that is a possibility.
Thank you for those
clarifications with respect to that issue. Based upon
that clarification, the court would still state that without
regard to that discrepancy, and I recognize that that
can be viewed in both the way I addressed it or it
could be viewed the way Mr. Marler indicates, I still
view, based on the totality of the facts and
circumstances in this case, that protection of society
does warrant the prison sentence the court has
imposed in this matter.
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(Tr., p.18, L.24- p.19, L.18.) Because the district court felt that the sentence imposed
was necessary irrespective of See's LSI score, it did not abuse its discretion by
imposing the sentence that was requested by both parties.
The district court considered all of the relevant information and imposed a
reasonable sentence. The sentence imposed is appropriate in light of See's disregard
for the law and his sex offender registration requirements and the risk he presents to
society. Given any reasonable view of the facts, See has failed to establish an abuse of
sentencing discretion.
See next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule
35 motion. If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of the
motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d
838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, See must "show that the sentence is excessive
in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in
support of the Rule 35 motion." l_g_,_ See has failed to satisfy his burden.
As acknowledged by See, he "did not submit any new information or
documentation in support of his Rule 35 motion." (Appellant's brief, pp.7-8; R., p.72.)
On appeal, See merely argues that his sentence was excessive as originally imposed
and, therefore, the district court should have reduced his sentence pursuant to his Rule
35 motion. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-8.) The state submits that by failing to establish his
sentence was excessive as imposed, See has also failed to establish that the district
court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion.
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Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm See's conviction and sentence
and the district court's order denying See's Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.
DATED this 25 th day of February, 2013.

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of February, 2013, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF to be placed in the United States
mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
STEPHEN D. THOMPSON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P.O. Box 1707
Ketchum, ID 83340

RI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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